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Introduction
The credible anti-in ‡ationist monetary policies conducted in major developed economies since the mid 1980s have been identi…ed as one plausible factor behind the Great moderation episode over the last two decades. However, as the dotcom boom and bust of the early 2000s and the recent subprime mortgage crisis prove it, …nancial crises associated with assets prices boom and bust episodes are not merely a relic of the twentieth century.
This unpleasant fact has recently prompted a debate about the role of in ‡ation targeting (IT) policies in the build-up of imbalances that eventually led to such episodes of …nancial turmoil. Indeed, some central bank watchers have regularly contended over the recent years that such policies, which aim primarily at stabilizing in ‡ation over a 2-3 years horizon, would actively contribute to damaging …nancial stability at longer horizons, as they would tend to neglect monetary and …nancial developments which are deemed irrelevant for future in ‡ation in the short to medium term. 1 While the consensus is broad in the economic profession that a policy focused at maintaining price stability is a necessary condition for maintaining also …nancial stability, the experience of the recent years has comforted the view that it is not a su¢ cient one. 2 First, there is a view that an in ‡ation targeting central bank may neglect important information about the build-up of …nancial imbalances which do not materialize rapidly into consumer price pressure. Many reasons may account for such a disconnection between …nancial and price developments. Among the usual suspects are the impact of globalization in terms of lower import prices and induced dampened domestic in ‡ation pressures, as well as the consequences of structural changes that have a¤ected the functioning of labour and 1 See notably a series of contributions by Claudio Borio, William White and their coauthors at the BIS , Borio and White, 2003 . Bean (2003) claims on the contrary that in ‡ation targets may be enough provided the central bank is su¢ ciently forward-looking. Recently, Leijonhufvud (2007) and De Grauwe (2007) have also expressed their concern that central banking could not be reduced to strict in ‡ation targeting without damaging consequences for both …nancial and macroeconomic stability. 2 Interestingly, the point has been repeatedly voiced in these terms by Mervyn King, Governor of the booms that sustain a rise in some asset prices-may take more time to show up into higher in ‡ation. As a conclusion, policy rates may fail to rise promptly enough to stem the build-up of …nancial imbalances (Borio and White, 2003) . 3 A recent paper by Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) provides another theoretical motivation for our study. They construct a general equilibrium model of housing prices where some agents su¤er from in ‡ation illusion, thus disagree about the level of ex ante real interest rates. While smart investors understand the Fisher equation, thus linking the level of nominal bond rates to their in ‡ation expectation, illusionary investors do not, therefore they systematically associate shifts in nominal rates with shifts in the real return of bonds. In this setup, the authors show that, when households are allowed to borrow against housing collateral, then a non-monotonic relationship occurs between house prices and in ‡ation, depending on the level of nominal rates. For instance, in the context of low nominal interest rates where smart investors have in ‡ation expectations below the longrun in ‡ation average and see investment in bonds as more rewarding, illusionary investors see investment opportunities in a leveraged housing portfolio, thus driving up house prices above the equilibrium value. While the authors' focus is more on the consequences of structural change in mortgage markets, their model also suggests a role for in ‡ation targeting in house price mispricing episodes, at least in a transitional phase. Consider for instance that the central bank adopts in ‡ation targeting and that only a portion of households adjust their in ‡ation expectations down to the central bank target. Disagreement about ex ante real rates may then be conducive of a housing price boom in a context of low 3 A more formal presentation of a similar argument has been put forward by Amato and Shin (2005) .
In their model, where private agents have diverse private information about the true state of the economy, the public signal provided by the central bank has a disproportionate e¤ect on agents'decisions, is likely to crowd out their private information and then tends to lower the information value of prices. 4 nominal rates. This is what we observed in the late '90s-early 2000s in many developed economies, a period when (less informed) households may have viewed borrowing as exceptionally cheap in real terms. We do not deny that structural factors, like a widespread shift towards more deregulated mortgage markets, are likely to have played an important role in fueling the recent rise in housing prices and explaining the correlation in housing price booms across most industrial economies. That said, in ‡ation targeting strategies may have been an additional destabilizing ingredient, at least until all agents converged to in ‡ation expectations in line with the central bank target.
We aim in this paper to bring such hypotheses to the data and evaluate whether in‡ation targeting actually mattered as regards housing price in ‡ation in developed OECD economies. Over the last decade, an abundant empirical literature has tried to quantify the macroeconomic performance of countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting. 4 Most studies focus on in ‡ation performance, in absolute or in relative terms, while some also examine whether adopting an in ‡ation targeting strategy could be made responsible for a more volatile output. However, to our knowledge, there is no comparative empirical work about the consequences of in ‡ation targeting policies for …nancial stability. We aim at …lling this gap, using a program evaluation methodology that has been recently transposed to macroeconomic issues (see notably Persson, 2001 and Ye, 2007) . We thus circumvent some self-selection bias that is likely to plague previous studies on the consequences of adopting in ‡ation targeting.
Our study encompasses 17 industrial economies over the period 1980-2006, among which nine countries have targeted in ‡ation at some dates. We …nd that the average e¤ect of in ‡ation targeting on house price in ‡ation is positive and statistically signi…cant. These results are robust to various speci…cations and options of the evaluation procedure. On average, the adoption of in ‡ation targeting is associated with an increase in the level of annual house price in ‡ation by some 2.1 percentage points in targeting countries. Note that the estimated e¤ect is even larger when the control sample is restricted to the most recent sub-period (from 1990 to 2006).
In the rest of the paper, section 2 provide a summary view of the recent housing price boom in developed OECD economies. Section 3 presents our econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the dataset and discusses several empirical issues. Section 5 comments on the results and section 6 concludes.
The housing price boom of the last decade
Since 1970, nominal housing price growth has ‡uctuated widely in developed economies, with four expansionary phases -in the early and late 1970s, in the mid to late 1980s and from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s-and four slowing phases -in the mid 1970s, the early 1980s, the early 1990s and from 2007 to present. 5 . Note that, while housing price busts are normally characterized by a signi…cant drop in real house prices, nominal house price de ‡ation is rare and was associated in the past with episodes of severe economic downturns, such as the recessions in the early 1990s in Finland, Norway and Sweden 6 .
Most developed economies have experienced rapidly rising house prices since the mid1990s. 7 Taken by its magnitude, length and geographical coverage, the latest boom has been quite exceptional. In the 17 OECD countries of our sample 8 , the annual rate of growth of nominal housing prices has reached an average of almost 7.5% between 1996 and 2006 (5.5% in real terms), to be compared with only 5.4% over the 1980-1995 period (0.5% in real terms). In addition, the recent boom lasted for almost ten years in most countries, which is roughly twice as long as the duration of past episodes.
An abundant literature has investigated the reasons why this housing boom was so pronounced and in particular decoupled that much from normal business cycle ‡uctuations. 5 See for instance Lecat and Mésonnier (2005) . 6 For a description of past housing booms and busts and the size of associated recessions in developped OECD economies, see for instance Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2008). 7 An exception is Germany whose nominal house prices have been gradually declining since they reached a modest peak in 1994. Japan is another obvious exception, the country being stuck over the whole 1990s in the slump consecutive to the housing price and stock market bust of the beginning of that decade.
The Japanese case being quite special, we excluded Japan from our database. Note that since Japan did not target in ‡ation over the period under review, excluding Japan tends to minimize the probability of rejecting the null of no-impact of IT on house price growth. We assess the buoyancy of the housing market according to both the annual rate of growth of housing prices in real terms (denoted RHOPG) and a price to rent ratio, which is akin to a price-earning ratio in stock markets (denoted HOPCPIH) and generally stands for an appropriate measure of housing valuation when housing is primarily viewed as an asset in the households' portfolio (instead of a source of housing services). 9 However, reliable and long enough time series on rents are not available for a number of countries , that often followed on a deregulation of the housing …nance sector. In the early 9 Note that we also considered nominal housing price growth as a dependent variable, adding lagged in ‡ation to the conditioning variables listed below in section 4. Results are qualitatively unchanged. We nevertheless preferred to focus on real growth (1) for comparability with other studies and (2) to limit the risk of having conditioning variables that are endogenous to the adoption of formal in ‡ation targeting. 
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The main quantity of interest for policy evaluation is generally what is called the average treatment e¤ect on treated (hence ATT), which is de…ned as:
Unfortunately, we face a problem of missing data. Since, in reality, each individual is either treated or untreated, we cannot observe both y 1 i ; y 0 i for all i, but only y i = D:y 1 i +(1 D):y 0 i . Besides, as argued above, it is reasonable in most economic applications to suspect that the treatment is not randomly a¤ected to observed units. Thus, measuring the ATT on the basis of the observed y variable is not straightforward. Indeed, in general, the di¤erence in sample means of the observed outcome for treated and untreated units is not equal to the ATT:
The usual solution from the program evaluation literature consists in using all the relevant extra information on the sampled individuals that we can gather, so as to randomize the treatment conditionally on this information. More precisely, suppose that we have measures of a list of determinants X i of y i which may also matter a priori for IT adoption (IT prerequisites). Then, if conditionally on the X i , we can reasonably assume that y 1 i ; y 0 i is independent of the strategy variable (or at least that they are mean independent) 11 , the conditional ATT reads:
which can be calculated using observed outcomes for the sample. It is then a priori easy to get an estimate of the AT T from the estimated conditional AT T (X) by simply averaging out the Xs. 12 However, if X i is a vector of macro (i.e. generally continuous) 1 1 This hypothesis is generally labelled the Conditional Independence Assumption in the evaluation literature. 1 2 If for instance X is a scalar taking m discontinuous values cm, then for each m, we just need to estimate 9 variables, getting an estimate of the conditional ATT for each possible value of X is obviously a complex matter. Fortunately, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed in a seminal contribution a very convenient solution to this dimensionality problem, which relies on the preliminary estimation of a propensity score p(X) of being treated conditionally on the observables: p(X) = Pr(D = 1jX). They showed indeed that, under the same conditional independence assumption as above, measuring the conditional ATT is equivalent to measuring :
The standard procedure runs then in two steps: one has …rst to estimate a propensity score using a probit regression of D on the covariates X and second to match the treated and untreated units according to their propensity scores in order to get estimates of the conditional treatment e¤ect. Averaging over all treated units yields an estimate of the unconditional ATT.
A variety of propensity score matching methodologies can be used. Basically, all matching estimators associate each treated unit to one or more control units with "close" propensity scores. They di¤er however both in the way the neighborhood for each treated observation is de…ned and with respect to the weights assigned to the non-treated "neighbors".
Although all estimators should converge asymptotically, the choice of a given method may matter in …nite samples. 13 Besides, handling with small samples, as is typically the case when microeconometric methods are applied to a macroeconomic context, raises speci…c concerns. 14 First, gaps are more likely to appear in the common support of controls and the simple means E [yijDi = 1; Xi = cm] and E [yijDi = 1; Xi = cm], and then to take the average of all the di¤erences over the m di¤erent values of X to get the unconditional AT T . 1 3 Note that the choice of a speci…c method involves a trade-o¤ between bias and variance of the estimator:
intuitively, extending the number of control units considered as relevant neighbours of a given treated unit increases the risk of bad matches, hence the bias, but contributes to reducing the variance, since more information is included in the counterfactual observation. 1 4 On issues associated with small samples, see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997).
treated, so that treatment e¤ects may be retrieved for a limited number of treated units only, resulting in a bias. Second, small samples increase the variance of estimated e¤ects, making identi…cation of signi…cant e¤ects more di¢ cult. According to a recent study by Frölich (2004) , kernel matching estimators, which compare treated units to a weighted mean of all control units on the common support, prove to be quite robust to small sample problems. We implemented a standard kernel matching method with a caliper of 6% in our baseline estimation. 15 Each treated unit is then matched to all control units weighted in proportion to the distance between the treated unit and the control unit. Formally, the kernel matching estimator of the ATT reads:
where I 1 denotes the set of treated, I 0 the set of controls, n 1 the number of treated units on the common support and p j is the estimated propensity scores of unit i. G(.)
is the kernel function and n the bandwidth parameter. In a standard way, we chose an Epanechnikov kernel de…ned as G (u) = 1 j u j 2 and a bandwidth parameter of 0.06.
The variance of this estimator was obtained by a bootstrap with 1000 replications. IT adoption to the year when an explicit or fully ‡edged IT scheme was implemented, including the publication of a quanti…ed in ‡ation objective by the central bank. 16 For robustness, we considered both de…nitions in the following, that we labelled IT1 for "soft" or merely announced in ‡ation targeting and IT2 for the adoption of a fully ‡edged targeting scheme. Table 1 shows the adoption dates according to both de…nitions. Depending on the de…nition, adoption dates di¤er for four countries in our sample: Canada (by three years), New Zealand (one year), Spain (one year) and Sweden (two years). In others cases both de…nitions converge. which have been both frequently described as implicit targeters by commentators. 17 In particular, the ECB, which commits itself explicitly to pursuing a quanti…ed in ‡ation objective, is arguably close to the in ‡ation targeting paradigm, although the ECB has steadily denied that its strategy is akin to standard IT. In our baseline experiment, we preferred not to introduce any arbitrariness in our classi…cation scheme and stuck to of…cial statements about the prevailing monetary policy strategies in both the US and the euro area. However, as a variant, we also considered the case of an alternative unbalanced country database where the euro area appears as such and is classi…ed as an in ‡ation targeter since its inception in 1999, while EMU member economies are simultaneously dropped from the database from 1999 on.
Propensity scores estimation
We estimate the propensity scores using a pooled probit where the dependent variable is the targeting dummy ( i.e. either IT1 for soft targeting or IT2 for fully ‡edged targeting) and the RHS variables are the factors deemed to in ‡uence both the choice of an in ‡ation targeting strategy and the dynamics of house prices. Remember however that the purpose of the probit regression is to reduce the dimensionality of the matching problem, not
to provide any plausible model of IT adoption. We must select all regressors that we would expect to have an impact on the ultimate variable of interest, here RHOPG, and could impinge on the IT status, thus implying a bias if we had computed the ATT without correction. Meanwhile, for the CIA to be valid, all conditioning variables should be chosen so that they are not in ‡uenced by the adoption of the IT regime. We thus take lags of most regressors so as to limit endogeneity problems.
Having this in mind, we …nally selected seven conditioning variables for our baseline speci…cation with reference to standard empirical models of housing price dynamics.
These conditioning variables are : the lagged short and long interest rates in real terms (RIRS_1 and RIRL_1), the lagged net household disposable income growth in real terms (NDIG_1), a …xed exchange rate regime dummy (FER), a dummy variable indicating the degree of sophistication of the national mortgage market (MS) and the lagged ratio of the private credit to GDP (CREGDP_1) as a proxy for national …nancial development 18 .
We took special care in correcting for cross-country heterogeneity in mortgage structures. Indeed, a few recent studies suggest that those structures matter for housing price 1 8 Data sources and construction are detailed in Appendix A. In some variants of the baseline speci…cation, we replaced the ratio of credit to GDP with the rate of net household savings to their disposable income (SAR), as a proxy of the capacity of housholds to borrow. We also choose a broader indicator of …nancial development such as liquid liabilities to GDP ratio as in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (1999). Finally, we tested the inclusion of a banking crisis dummy (BKCR). None of these changes did a¤ect qualitatively our results. The results are available upon request to the authors.
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dynamics. 19 They can also have a bearing on the probability to adopt or not an in ‡a-tion targeting scheme. Indeed, one may argue that monetary authorities are more likely to implement IT when they gauge that the domestic banking and …nancial systems are developed enough for monetary transmission to work through quickly and e¢ ciently. 20 In practice, controlling for di¤erences in mortgage structures between countries is not an easy task because most available data on the mortgage market characteristics of OECD countries are qualitative, or given as constant for the last two decades (which means that they may actually refer to di¤erent periods of time), thus ignoring possible trend changes in market regulations or practices (as the extension of securitization or the decrease in credit standards over the last decade).
To bypass these data limitations, we can use some proxies for …nancial development, such as the private credit-to-GDP ratio 21 . Another possibility is to construct a composite index summarizing institutional aspects of the mortgage markets such as the IMF (2008) recently did it. A quick look at mortgage market characteristics as shown in table 2 suggests that IT countries are predominantly countries where for instance variable rate mortgages prevail, mortgage equity withdrawal is at least legally possible and often used and loan-to-value ratios of mortgages are relatively high. However, it is fair to note that some non-targeters do also share the same structural characteristics. 14 rate mortgages). 23 On this basis, we classi…ed each country as having either a "highly sophisticated" (M M SI = 1) or a "less sophisticated" or ‡exible (M M SI = 0) mortgage market. Table 2 gives a view of institutional features of mortgage markets in our sample of countries, as well as the value of our dummy variable. The institutional features of national mortgage markets among OECD countries remain quite heterogenous. Broadly speaking, IT countries (Australia, UK, Sweden and Norway) provide the easiest access to home ownership. In contrast, in non IT countries (France, Italy, Germany, Belgium) the access to housing …nance is somewhat constrained. Nevertheless, some exceptions remain such as the US and the Netherlands (both "highly sophisticated" mortgage markets but non IT countries).
Let us turn now to the expected signs of the estimated coe¢ cients in the probit regressions. On the basis of previous studies, we would expect real interest rates and the …xed exchange rate regime to be negatively correlated with the probability of running an in ‡ation targeting strategy. On the contrary, we would expect a positive coe¢ cient for the CREGDP variable and the mortgage structure dummy, since a developed …nancial system warranting an e¢ cient transmission of monetary policy is often seen as one of the prerequisites for IT adoption. 24 . We would also expect a positive sign for the net disposable income growth. Table 3 provides summary statistics for housing price growth in real terms and the set of conditioning variables chosen. The comparison of the means of the relevant variables across non-in ‡ation targeting and in ‡ation targeting countries reveals that in ‡ation targeters exhibit on average higher real house price in ‡ation (at least for the years when IT is e¤ectively implemented), as well as a larger banking credit to GDP ratio. However, they display lower in ‡ation, lower short and long term real interest rates as well as lower savings to income ratios. These preliminary statistics hint that a simple comparison of housing price in ‡ation in IT vs non-IT countries is potentially a¤ected by non-random selection of the "treated", due notably to di¤erences in …nancial systems and the degree of …nancial development or sophistication, which should bias the result if they are not controlled for.
This again provides support to the program evaluation methodology we adopted here. adoption, it is noteworthy that it does a relatively good job in discriminating the two types of countries. Indeed, we can see a marked di¤erence in the densities of propensity score between targeters and non targeters. It can also be seen that changes in the de…nition of IT adoption dates a¤ect the densities to a lesser extent than changes in the control group. However, whatever the size of the control group or the timing of IT adoption, the densities relative to targeters and non-targeters still have a large common support 26 , which warrants that we can implement a matching strategy based on a comparison of the propensity scores. 2 5 As a robustness test, we estimated a panel probit with random e¤ects to control for unobservable heterogeneity across countries. The magnitude and sign of all the coe¢ cients did not change. 2 6 De…ned as the intersection of the densities.
Results of matching
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to the 1990s and 2000s.
The …rst column of table 5 refers to our baseline speci…cation. Targeting in ‡ation appears to be associated with a signi…cant average extra-growth of real housing prices, whatever the dates of IT adoption and the size of the control group. The size of the e¤ect is larger and indeed quite large when the control group is restricted to data posterior to 1990, but the point estimator of the ATT is then more likely to be a¤ected by small sample bias and a lack of common support.
We checked the robustness of this positive e¤ect of IT strategies on housing prices along several dimensions. As a …rst check, we implemented various alternative matching procedures to estimate the ATT. 27 As is commonly the case, we …nd that our results are quite robust to the choice of the matching procedure, although the e¤ect tends to be less signi…cant when matched controls are taken from a narrowing neihgborhood around a given treated unit (e.g. within a caliper of 1%). Indeed, whenever a caliper is set with a value below 2%, up to a third of treated units can be automatically dropped because of the vanishing common support. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether applying such a strict caliper limit in the case of a relatively small database of macroeconomic outcomes is warranted, although it is common in the microeconometric literature. Table 5 also displays the estimated ATT when some outlier observations are …rst discarded from the sample, when alternative conditioning variables are considered in the propensity score estimation or when the ATT is computed for alternative dependent variables. In column 2, we discarded observations within the …rst percentile of the real housing price growth variable, so as to temper the possible favorable impact of severe housing price busts which occurred in non targeting countries in the 1980s and early 1990s. 28 Column 3
shows the estimated ATT when the level of …nancial development is measured by the ratio 2 7 We tested one and three nearest-neighbors matching with replacement, with and without a caliper, radius (or caliper) matching, using caliper from 1% to 5%, as well as local linear matching. The results remained qualitatively unchanged. Detailed results are not reproduced here for brevity but are available upon request to the authors.
of net savings of households to their net disposable income instead of the ratio of private credit to GDP. The estimated e¤ect is somehow dampened when using control units from the whole sample period, but remains elevated and signi…cant whenever control units are taken from the most recent subperiod. 29 Column 4 tests the impact of targeting in ‡ation on nominal housing price growth (HOPG) instead of real growth. 30 Finally, the last column shows estimates of the ATT for the housing price to rent ratio (HOPCPIH). Targeting in ‡ation also appears to be systematically associated with a higher price to rent ratio. The e¤ect is positive and signi…cant when strict targeting is considered and controls are taken in the whole period of observation, but is larger and very signi…cant if the control sample is restricted to the post-1990 period.
Note that, considering the small size of our sample compared with typical datasets used in the program evaluation literature, an important issue is whether the results are driven by housing market developments in one particular country. To check this, we exclude sequentially each country and estimate the ATT on the basis of the remaining 16 countries only. Table 7 shows the estimated ATT on RHOPG (in the baseline speci…cation).
Globally, the results are una¤ected by the exclusion of any individual country.
As a variant, table 6 presents the results of the same ATT estimations when the euro area is added to the database as a genuine in ‡ation targeter from 1999 to 2006, instead of individual EMU member countries. Again, the conclusions reached from the baseline experiment are qualitatively unchanged. Overall, we thus …nd a robust evidence of a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of running an IT strategy on housing price in ‡ation and the house price to rent ratio. Ceteris paribus, in ‡ation targeting is associated with an increase in real housing price growth by some 2.2 percentage points, averaging our …ndings across all model variants, while the price to rent ratio is increased by some 10 percentage points.
To end with, table 8 provides standard quality-matching indicators. Technically, the self-selection bias which motivates the matching procedure is controlled for if the covariates X 's are su¢ ciently balanced by the matching process, i.e. they appear to have the same distribution for matched treated and non-treated. Overall, we …nd that matching on the estimated propensity score balances the X 's in the matched samples quite well. The standard balancing test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is a two-sample t-test of the null that there are no signi…cant di¤erences left in the means of conditioning variables across both groups. The null was never rejected at 10% for any covariate, whatever the sample and model variant. Consistently with the results of the t-tests for individual covariates, the median covariate bias between the treated and control groups, which ranged between 4.2% and 13.25% before matching, is reduced to below 1% by the matching procedure. 31 As expected, the pseudo-R 2 of the probit decreases sharply after matching, which suggests that there is no systematic di¤erence left in the distribution of covariates between both groups. In addition, the joint signi…cance of the regressors is always rejected after matching, while it is always accepted before matching. Hence, we can conclude that our kernel matching procedure proved able to wipe out most of the initial selection bias.
Conclusion
In this study we implemented standard program evaluation techniques to assess whether the choice of an in ‡ation targeting (IT) strategy by the central bank had any signi…cant impact on housing price dynamics in 17 developed OECD economies. This exercise was thought as an empirical test of recurrent but generally informal critics that are addressed to the in ‡ation targeting paradigm from the perspective of its possible detrimental impact on …nancial stability.
Our central …ndings support the idea that the adoption of IT had a signi…cant impact on the growth rate of house prices as well as on the house price to rent ratio. These results appear to be quite robust, but it is fair to say that they may su¤er from several data limitations, in particular regarding the quality and comparability of house price 3 1 Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , for a given covariate X, the standardized di¤erence before matching is the di¤erence in the sample means in the full treateed and non-treated groups as a percentage of the square root mean of the sample variances in both groups. After matching, the respective means are computed over the treated and the non-treated units that fall on the common support.
data across countries. In addition, given that, for most countries, data on credit for house purchase is not available on a su¢ ciently long period, testing simultaneously for an impact of IT on mortgage credit growth remained out of reach. This would have usefully completed the picture, since the latest housing price boom was clearly sustained by a concomitant credit boom in most countries.
Overall, the evidence presented provides an impetus for further research, both theoretical and empirical, on the relatively neglected issue of the consequences of in ‡ation targeting strategies for asset price ‡uctuations. Then, we calculated, as in Borio and Lowe (2002) , the ratio CREGDP of nominal credit to nominal GDP (as taken from the OECD EO database). 3 2 More details on the house-price series are available in Arthur (2005 and for the other categories, the dummy variable equals 0.
The IMF mortgage market index summarizes 5 institutional characteritics of the mortgage market (see Table 1 
